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1 Introduction
In SocioPlug, we have particular concerns about data protection. Services proposed by SocioPlug will
conform to European regulations [REG08, Com12], during personal data collection and data access. In
particular the right to oblivion, collection and access purposes should be explicitly determined by data
owners.
SocioPlug’s architecture is fully distributed and has no centralized server, thereafter, there is no central-
ized control about data and applications of users. The goal is to avoid the existence of a “big brother”
vigilating every person of the social cloud. Nevertheless, collaboration implies accessing personal data of
other users. As services and data will be distributed in a social cloud, participants must be responsible of
their data but also of other’s data they collect and use. Thus, they must define usage policies for each shared
data and people that collects and uses other’s data must preserve stated policies.
From application scenarios described in deliverable D.4.1, in this report, we identify some important
privacy breach scenarios that may appear in SocioPlug.
2 Breach scenarios
2.1 Breach Scenario 1. Data collection and data usage without stating usage
policies
All application scenarios of SocioPlug manage personal data.
• PlugTrack collects user’s location from a mobile device and upload it on the personal plug computer
of the user. To improve recommendations, PlugTrack collects also other users’ location. These
information is used for recommendations to people having similar itineraries or interests.
• Collaborative editor produces documents that can be shared and used by people collaborating in the
document edition but also by non-editors.
• Smart city application is based on publishing and querying streams of data coming from several user’s
sensors.
• Collaborative content sharing application allows users to share files with other users. It proposes also
to create dynamic communities of users who have shown similar interests. The idea is to disseminate
content to a target group of users.
Privacy of users will be transgressed if data used by these applications is collected, used and stored
arbitrarily by anyone. Thus, to preserve privacy, it is of utmost importance to define and attach a usage
control policy to each data used. Usage policies should contain the context under which data can be used,
i.e., which application or user can use it, for how long, for which purposes, in which location, which
operations are allowed, what is prohibited, what are the obligations when/after accessing data, when data
should be deleted, etc.
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SocioPlug users should carefully define their usage policies and applications should be encouraged to use
data only if they have valid policies. Applications should take care also of suppressing data when duration
time of usage arrives to expiration. Several languages exist to define usage policies as PriLoo[AD13],
privacy policies like ODRL [Ian02], PPO [SP11], or L4LOD [VG13], and licences such as CC [Com01],
GPL [Pro07], or OpenLicence [Pro11]. Definition of usage policies can use a combination these languages
but the singularity of PriLoo is that the usage context is taken into account clearly. So we encourage to use
PriLoo in SocioPlug applications.
2.2 Breach Scenario 2. Data combination without combining usage policies
Stating policies for each used data is not enough to deal with privacy. When collaborating, it is frequently
necessary to combine several data. Thus usage policies of concerned data should also be combined.
• PlugTrack combines data of different users having similar journeys or itineraries to propose more
pertinent recommendations.
• Collaborative editor may fusion several documents in a single document.
• Smart city application may query several streams for personal use or for dissemination.
• Collaborative content sharing application allocates in a same repository, files provided by different
users.
• From a non-functional point of view, monitoring activity process, provided by Task 3 of SocioPlug,
will merge streams of data, which are not produced by a single user, but by the architecture network
activities.
In these cases, which will be the usage policy of the resulting data? What should be possible to do
with data resulting of a data merging? To deal with this breach, it is necessary to have an approach to
produce a usage policy from the combination of several usage policies. Some works propose solutions for
policies combination like PrODUCE [SMSADGM15] or [GRVG13]. [GRVG13] proposes a deontic logic
semantics to define the deontic components of licenses and generate a composite license compliant with
the licensing items of the composed different licenses. PrODUCE proposes a different approach which is
based on semantic web technologies to compose privacy policies. The originality of this approach is that
composition rules are based on the data usage context and deduce implicit terms. SocioPlug applications
should determine which approach better fits their needs of policies combination. We encourage them to use
PrODUCE that is an approach easy to use and based on semantic web technologies (i.e., RDF and deduction
rules).
2.3 Breach Scenario 3. Usage control
In a fully distributed architecture, as the one used in SocioPlug, participants are peers playing the roles of
users and data providers. As there is no centralized entity, data providers participate in distributed query
processing without knowing they actually do. Only the requester query engine knows the federated query
it process. Thus, federated queries exist but, apart from federated query engines, nobody knows which
data sources are joined. This is a usage control breach because data providers have no control about the
distributed usage of their data.
• PlugTrack may produce a distributed query to simultaneously collect information of other PlugTrack
users. But, each user does not know she participates in a distributed query, thus she does not know
her information is combined with others’ information.
• Collaborative editor may query other plugs about documents concerning a particular topic. But each
plug owner does not know she participates in a distributed query.
• Smart city may produce also distributed queries to simultaneously query several users’ streams. But,
each stream owner does not know her stream is combined with other streams.
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SocioPlug application Breach scenario 1 Breach scenario 2 Breach scenario 3
PlugTrack x x x
Collaborative editing x x x
Smart city x x x
Collaborative content x
Monitoring activities (Task3) x
Table 1: Table showing which breach scenarios occur in which application
Thus, how to know if a data provider is participating in a distributed query? And how to discover the
concerned distributed query if query users (or query engines) do not publish them? This is an open issue but
some works are emerging. FETA [NSAMD15], proposes a federated query tracking approach in the context
of the linked data. Based on a set of heuristics, original federated Basic Graph Patterns are extracted from
a shared log maintained by a federation of data providers.
2.4 Summary
In this report we presented some privacy breach scenarios that may appear in SocioPlug. For each on we
mention some possible solutions to adopt/adapt. Table 1 shows these scenarios and the application they
appear.
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